Nicole Wolkov, Grace Mappes, Davit Gasparyan, Daria Novikov, and Kateryna Stepanenko with Nate Trotter
March 26, 2025, 6:30pm ET
Click here
to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This
map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.
Click here to see ISW's interactive map of Ukraine's offensive in Kursk Oblast.
Click here
to see ISW’s 3D control of terrain topographic map of Ukraine. Use of a
computer (not a mobile device) is strongly recommended for using this
data-heavy tool.
Click here
to access ISW’s archive of interactive time-lapse maps of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine. These maps complement the static control-of-terrain
map that ISW produces daily by showing a dynamic frontline. ISW will
update this time-lapse map archive monthly.
Note:
The data cut-off for this product was 12pm ET on March 26. ISW will
cover subsequent reports in the March 27 Russian Offensive Campaign
Assessment.
The details of the ceasefire
agreements on energy strikes and maritime operations in the Black Sea
that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials reached on March 24 and 25
remain unclear. Russia and Ukraine appear to agree that a
ceasefire against strikes on energy infrastructure is active as of March
25, but US and Ukrainian statements continue to make clear that
technical negotiations are ongoing.[1] Ukrainian Presidential Office
Deputy Head Pavlo Palisa stated on March 26 that Ukraine is still
working to develop monitoring mechanisms for the ceasefires, which is
consistent with US, Russian, and Ukrainian statements on March 25
jointly agreeing to develop measures to implement the energy
infrastructure ceasefire.[2] Palisa stated that both ceasefires on Black
Sea operations and strikes against energy infrastructure came into
force upon the publication of the joint US-Ukrainian statement on March
25.[3] Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov claimed on March 26 that
Russian forces are implementing Russian President Vladimir Putin's March
18 order to adhere to the ceasefire on energy infrastructure
strikes.[4] The absence of officially published joint texts of the
agreements that Ukraine and Russia signed continues to make evaluating
the specifics of these ceasefires difficult, and the ceasefire terms
remain unclear.[5]
Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) accused Ukrainian forces of
attempting to strike energy infrastructure in Kursk Oblast on March 25,
gas infrastructure in occupied Crimea overnight on March 25 to 26, and
electrical infrastructure in Bryansk Oblast on March 26.[6] The
Ukrainian General Staff responded on March 26 and denied the Russian
MoD's accusations.[7] Kursk Oblast Acting Governor Alexander Khinshtein,
Crimea occupation head Sergei Aksyonov, and Bryansk Oblast Governor
Alexander Bogomaz notably did not report Ukrainian drone strikes in
their respective regions. Russian governors and occupation officials
typically publicly announce when Ukrainian drones attempt to strike
infrastructure in their regions. Ukrainian Presidential Communications
Advisor Dmytro Lytvyn stated on March 25 that Russian forces have
conducted eight strikes on Ukrainian energy facilities since March 18,
when Putin claimed to have ordered the Russian military to stop strikes
against Ukrainian energy infrastructure facilities.[8] Ukrainian
officials have reported that Russian overnight strike series have
damaged civilian infrastructure across Ukraine almost every night since
March 18 but have not specified which strikes specifically damaged
energy infrastructure.[9]
Russian officials
explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent suggestion that
the United States could be involved in operating the Russian-occupied
Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). Trump stated on March
19 during a phone call with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky that
the United States is interested in taking control of the ZNPP, which
Russian forces currently occupy — implying that Russia would have to
cede this territory in Zaporizhia Oblast before the United States can
take control of the ZNPP.[10] The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) stated on March 26 that the transfer of the ZNPP's territory or
control over it to Ukraine or any other country is "impossible" and that
the possibility of Russia jointly operating the ZNPP with any country
is "unacceptable."[11] The Russian MFA added that it would be "absurd"
to allow any international organization to help operate the ZNPP. The
Russian MFA attempted to justify Russia's illegal occupation of the ZNPP
by claiming that Russian President Vladimir Putin's October 2022 decree
legally brought the ZNPP under Russian jurisdiction. Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Alexander Novak also stated on March 26 that Russia is
not considering jointly operating the ZNPP with the United States.[12]
The Kremlin routinely falsely portrays itself as the only safe operator
of the ZNPP, despite having endangered the ZNPP since Russian forces
occupied the area in March 2022.[13] Russia has notably stored military
equipment near the ZNPP reactors and in the turbine halls and used ZNPP
grounds to launch strike drones.[14] The Kremlin also routinely accuses
Ukraine of endangering the ZNPP and may attempt to intensify these
narratives to spoil ongoing US-Ukrainian negotiations.[15]
The
European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite
Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a
temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea. European
Commission's Foreign Affairs Spokesperson Anitta Hipper stated on March
26 that the EU would consider lifting or amending sanctions against
Russia if Russia "end[s] its unprovoked aggression in Ukraine" and
"unconditonal[ly] withdraw[s]" all Russian forces from Ukraine.[16]
Hipper's statement is likely a response to the Kremlin's recent demand
that it will not implement the terms of the ceasefire in the Black Sea
with Ukraine until the US lifts sanctions on Russian state-owned
agricultural bank Rosselkhozbank and other unspecified financial
organizations involved in international food and fertilizer trade.[17]
The United States will likely require EU cooperation in order to lift
some sanctions and restrictions on Russian agricultural, financial, and
trade entities to reconnect Russia to international agricultural and
fertilizer markets.
Key Takeaways:
- The
details of the ceasefire agreements on energy strikes and maritime
operations in the Black Sea that US, Ukrainian, and Russian officials
reached on March 24 and 25 remain unclear.
- Russia and Ukraine exchanged accusations of strikes and ceasefire violations, although the ceasefire terms remain unclear.
- Russian
officials explicitly rejected US President Donald Trump's recent
suggestion that the United States could be involved in operating the
Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).
- The
European Union (EU) will likely maintain sanctions on Russia despite
Russian demands for Western sanctions relief as preconditions for a
temporary ceasefire with Ukraine in the Black Sea.
- Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast, near Toretsk, Velyka Novosilka, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian forces recently advanced in Belgorod Oblast and near Toretsk.
- Russia
continues reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part of
an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force
(USF).
We
do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities
are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the
military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue
to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on
the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on
combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations
of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes
against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports.
Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation
Russian forces recently advanced in Kursk Oblast amid continued attacks in Kursk Oblast and the Kursk-Sumy Oblast border area.
Assessed
advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates that
Russian forces recently advanced east of Oleshnya (southwest of
Sudzha).[18]
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian milblogger
claimed that elements of the Russian 34th Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and
unspecified Russian Airborne (VDV) elements advanced near Veselivka
(northeast of Sumy City along the international border).[19]
Russian
forces attacked west of Sudzha near Gogolevka, near the Sudzha
checkpoint along the international border southwest of Sudzha, and
northeast of Sumy City along the international border near Veselivka and
Zhuravka.[20]
Order of Battle: Elements of the Russian
177th Naval Infantry Regiment (Caspian Flotilla), the "Arctic" Battalion
of the 40th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet), and 22nd and 30th
Motorized Rifle Regiments (both of the 72nd Motorized Rifle Division,
44th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) are reportedly
operating near Guyevo (south of Sudzha).[21] Elements of the Russian
83rd VDV Brigade are reportedly operating near Zhuravka.[22]
Ukrainian forces recently advanced along the international border in northwestern Belgorod Oblast.
Assessed
advances: Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces
advanced into northern Demidovka (northwest of Belgorod City).[23]
Russian
milbloggers claimed that fighting continued in Demidovka and Popovka
(west of Demidovka).[24] A Russian milblogger claimed on March 26 that
the intensity of fighting in the Belgorod international border area has
decreased due to unfavorable weather conditions.[25]
Order
of Battle: Elements of the Russian 128th Motorized Rifle Brigade (44th
AC, LMD) and "Aida" Akhmat Spetsnaz Detachment are reportedly operating
near Popovka (west of Demidovka).[26] Ukrainian military observer
Kostyantyn Mashovets stated that the Russian military command has
deployed elements of the Russian 3rd Motorized Rifle Division (20th CAA,
Moscow Military District [MMD]), 88th and 85th motorized rifle brigades
(both of the 3rd CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People's Republic [LNR] AC,
SMD), and unspecified elements of the 6th CAA (LMD) to Belgorod
Oblast.[27] Mashovets added that the Russian military command already
moved a part of its 6th CAA (LMD), 20th CAA, and 3rd CAA reserves to
Belgorod Oblast from Kupyansk, Lyman, and Siversk-Chasiv Yar directions,
respectively.
Russian Main Effort – Eastern Ukraine
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Kharkiv Oblast (Russian
objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border
with Belgorod Oblast and approach to within tube artillery range of
Kharkiv City
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kharkiv direction on March 26 but did not advance.
Ukraine's
Khortytsia Group of Forces reported on March 26 that Russian forces
conducted a reinforced platoon-sized mechanized assault with four
armored vehicles toward Tykhe (northeast of Kharkiv City) and that
Ukrainian forces destroyed three armored vehicles and damaged one
armored vehicle.[28] Russian forces conducted ground attacks northeast
of Kharkiv City near Vovchansk and Tykhe on March 25 and 26.[29]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Luhansk Oblast
(Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push
westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces reached the
outskirts of Mala Shapkivka (northwest of Kupyansk).[30]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks north of Kupyansk along the
Zapadne-Kalynove line; northeast of Kupyansk near Dvorichna, Sahunivka,
and Holubivka and toward Kamyanka; and east of Kupyansk near
Petropavlivka on March 25 and 26.[31]
Ukrainian Khortytsia
Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov reported on March
26 that Ukrainian forces destroyed a column of Russian armored vehicles,
likely attempting to dismount infantry, in the Kupyansk direction on
March 25 and that Russian forces lose up to 50 armored vehicles per
week.[32] Trehubov reported that Russian forces in the Kupyansk
direction regularly use armored vehicle columns to transport infantry to
the frontline rather than to conduct mechanized assaults.
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Borova direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Russian
forces continued ground attacks northeast of Borova near Zahryzove,
east of Borova near Kopanky and Nadiya, and southeast of Borova towards
Olhivka, Nove, and Katerynivka on March 25 and 26.[33]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed claims: A Russian source claimed that Russian forces advanced 500 meters near Yampolivka (northeast of Lyman).[34]
Russian
forces continued ground attacks northeast of Lyman near Yampolivka and
Kolodyazi and east of Lyman near Torske and Zarichne on March 25 and
26.[35]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Siversk direction on March 26 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Siversk near
Bilohorivka, east of Siversk near Verkhnokamyanske, and southeast of
Siversk near Ivano-Darivka on March 25 and 26.[36]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction on March 26 but did not advance.
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Chasiv Yar itself and south
of Chasiv Yar toward Predtechyne, and near Bila Hora, Stupochky, and
Dyliivka on March 25 and 26.[37]
Order of Battle: Elements
of the Russian "Sever-V” Volunteer Brigade (Russian Volunteer Corps)
and 215th Reconnaissance Battalion (98th Airborne [VDV] Division) are
reportedly operating near Chasiv Yar.[38]
A spokesperson
of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated on
March 26 that Russian forces have increased the number of guided glide
bomb and fiber-optic drone strikes in the area.[39] An officer of a
Ukrainian brigade operating in the Chasiv Yar direction stated that
Russian personnel operating in the area are poorly trained and that
Russian forces usually attack in smaller groups.[40]
Russian and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Toretsk direction.
Assessed
Ukrainian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 23 indicates
that Ukrainian forces recently advanced along Odeska Street in
northwestern Toretsk and along Darhomyzhskoho Street in northern
Toretsk.[41]
Assessed Russian advances: Geolocated footage
published on March 25 indicates that Russian forces recently advanced
in the Toretska mine in northern Toretsk and westward along the O0524
highway northwest of Toretsk.[42]
Unconfirmed claims: A
Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces advanced 2.5 kilometers
west of Niu York (south of Toretsk), in northern Toretsk, and toward
Avanhard Stadium in central Toretsk, and in the Fomikha Mine waste heap
(northern Toretsk).[43] Another Russian milblogger claimed that elements
of the Russian 68th Tank Regiment (150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th
Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD]) and the 20th
Motorized Rifle Regiment (possibly a reformed Soviet unit) are clearing
Olesksandropil and Panteleymonivka (both southwest of Toretsk).[44]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations near Toretsk itself; north of
Toretsk near Dyliivka and Dachne; and east of Toretsk near Krymske; and
southwest of Toretsk near Sukha Balka on March 25 and 26.[45]
A
spokesperson of a Ukrainian brigade operating in the Toretsk direction
stated on March 26 that Russian forces use green tape identification
marks to mimic identification marks used by the Ukrainian military in
order to prevent Ukrainian drone operators from easily identifying and
striking them.[46] Such deceptive tactics may amount to acts of perfidy -
a war crime under the Geneva Convention.[47] The Geneva Convention
defines perfidy as "acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead
him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord,
protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed
conflict, with intent to betray that confidence." Russian Ministry of
Defense's (MoD) Main Military-Political Directorate Deputy Head and
Akhmat Spetsnaz Commander, Major General Apti Alaudinov, recently
claimed that Russian forces similarly used blue electrical tape
identification marks - which he claimed Ukrainian forces also use -
during an attack in Kursk Oblast to "prevent the Ukrainian military from
understanding what was happening."[48]
Order of Battle:
Elements of the Russian 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 238th
Artillery Brigade (both of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division, 8th CAA,
SMD) are reportedly operating near Shcherbynivka (west of Toretsk).[49]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Pokrovsk direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces advanced
north of Uspenivka (southwest of Pokrovsk).[50] Russian milbloggers
claimed that Russian forces advanced near Lysivka (southeast of
Pokrovsk) and in northwestern Kotlyne (southwest of Pokrovsk).[51]
Russian
forces conducted offensive operations northeast of Pokrovsk near
Tarasivka and toward Malynivka; east of Pokrovsk near Zelene Pole,
Yelyzavetivka, and Promin; southeast of Pokrovsk near Lysivka; south of
Pokrovsk near Shevchenko, Novopavlivka, and Vidrodzhennya (fomerly Novyi
Trud); and southwest of Pokrovsk near Kotlyne, Udachne, Preobrazhenka,
Bohdanivka, Uspenivka, Novoukrainka, Kotlyarivka, Novoserhiivka,
Pishchane, and Novooleksandrivka on March 25 and 26.[52] Russian
milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Lysivka,
Solone, and Uspenivka.[53]
Order of Battle: Elements of a
tank battalion of the Russian 1st "Slavic" Motorized Rifle Brigade (51st
CAA, formerly 1st Donetsk People's Republic [DNR] Army Corps [AC], SMD)
reportedly continue operating in the Pokrovsk direction.[54]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kurakhove direction on March 26 but did not make confirmed advances.
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced north
of Andriivka (west of Kurakhove) and 1.5 kilometers near Rozlyv
(southwest of Kurakhove).[55]
Russian forces continued
ground attacks west of Kurakhove near Kostyanynopil and Andriivka and
southwest of Kurakhove near Rozlyv on March 25 and 26.[56] Russian
sources claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully counterattacked
near Rozlyv.[57]
A Russian milblogger claimed that
fighting in the Kurakhove direction is more active since the seizure of
Kostyantynopil has allowed Russian forces to press on Rozlyv from the
north and south.[58] ISW assessed that Russian forces seized
Kostyantynopil as of March 9.[59]
Russian forces recently advanced in the Velyka Novosilka direction.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 26 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced to eastern Vilne Pole (northwest
of Velyka Novosilka).[60]
Russian forces attacked north of
Velyka Novosilka near Dniproenerhiya, Vesele, and Skudne; northwest of
Velyka Novosilka near Vilne Pole and Pryvilne; and west of Velyka
Novosilka near Novopil and Novosilka on March 25 and 26.[61] Ukrainian
sources reported on March 25 that Ukrainian forces recently repelled a
reduced company-sized mechanized assault near Velyka Novosilka.[62] A
Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near
Vilne Pole.[63]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Neither Ukrainian nor Russian sources reported ground activity in the Hulyaipole direction on March 26.
Order
of Battle: Drone operators and artillery elements of the Russian 1198th
Motorized Rifle Regiment and 64th Motorized Rifle Brigade (both of the
35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) are
reportedly striking Ukrainian targets in the Polohy direction.[64]
Russian forces recently advanced in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
Assessed
Russian advances: Geolocated footage published on March 25 indicates
that Russian forces recently advanced along the T-0812 Vasylivka-Orikhiv
highway in western Stepove (northwest of Robotyne).[65]
Unconfirmed
claims: Russian milbloggers claimed on March 26 that Russian forces,
including elements of the Russian 108th and 247th Airborne (VDV)
regiments (both of the 7th VDV Division), advanced north, west, and east
of Lobkove (northwest of Robotyne) and within central Lobkove.[66]
Russian
forces attacked north of Robotyne near Mala Tokmachka and northwest of
Robotyne near Lobkove, Maly Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Stepove, and
Kamyanske on March 25 and 26.[67] A Russian milblogger claimed on March
26 that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Stepove, Lobkove, and
Shcherbaky.[68]
Order of Battle: Drone operators of the
Russian 70th Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division,
58th CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) are reportedly operating
near Mala Tokmachka, and drone operators of the Russian BARS-Sarmat
Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center (formerly BARS-Sarmat
Detachment, Russian Combat Army Reserve) are reportedly striking
Ukrainian positions in the Kamyanske direction.[69]
Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Dnipro (Kherson) direction on March 25 and 26 but did not advance.[70]
Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign (Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline)
Russian
forces conducted a series of drone strikes against Ukraine on the night
of March 25 and 26. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian
forces launched 117 Shahed and decoy drones from the directions of Kursk
City; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai; and
occupied Cape Chauda, Crimea.[71] The Ukrainian Air Force reported that
Ukrainian forces downed 56 drones and that 49 were ”lost,” likely due
to Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) interference. Ukrainian officials
reported that Russian forces struck infrastructure in Sumy,
Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovohrad, and Cherkasy oblasts and conducted the
largest Shahed strike against Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast since
the start of the war in February 2022.[72]
Ukrainian
Center for Countering Disinformation Head Lieutenant Andriy Kovalenko
reported on March 26 that Russian forces are preparing new Shahed launch
sites and expanding Shahed crews to increase the number of Shahed
strikes against Ukraine.[73]
Russian Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)
Russia
continued to reorganize drone detachments into new units likely as part
of an ongoing effort to establish the Russian Unmanned Systems Force
(USF). Former Roscosmos (Russian space agency) head and Zaporizhia
Oblast occupation senator Dmitry Rogozin announced on March 25 that
Russian authorities have reorganized the BARS-Sarmat Detachment into the
BARS-Sarmat Unmanned Systems Special Purpose Center.[74] Rogozin also
noted that the BARS-Sarmat Center added two new combat testing
battalions. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) began efforts to
establish a separate branch for unmanned systems within the Russian
Armed Forces in mid to late 2024 by reorganizing informal drone
detachments into MoD-controlled units.[75]
The Kremlin
continues efforts to militarize Russian youth as part of long-term force
generation efforts. Russian President Vladimir Putin met with the board
of the “Movement of the First” youth military-patriotic organization on
March 26 and claimed that 11 million people have joined the
organization since its founding in 2022.[76] The Kremlin uses the
Movement of the First to militarize society in Russia and occupied
Ukraine, particularly among children, and Movement of the First's Board
Chairperson Artur Orlov stated that the organization aims to attract up
to 18 million participants by 2030.[77]
Russian Technological Adaptations (Russian objective: Introduce technological innovations to optimize systems for use in Ukraine)
Russian
drone designer VVZ Drones stated on March 26 that it developed the
"Sifa" first-person view (FPV) drone, which can strike helicopters and
other drones.[78] VVZ Drones claimed that the Sifa drone has a payload
of up to 0.7 kilograms and a flight speed of over 225 kilometers per
hour.
Activities in Russian-occupied areas
(Russian objective: Consolidate administrative control of annexed
areas; forcibly integrate Ukrainian citizens into Russian sociocultural,
economic, military, and governance systems)
ISW is not publishing coverage of activities in Russian-occupied areas today.
Significant activity in Belarus (Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks)
Nothing significant to report.
Note:
ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only
publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian,
Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as
commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as
the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided
in the endnotes of each update.
[1] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025
[2] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025
[3]
https://www.facebook.com/Pavlo.Palisa/posts/pfbid02DqN3gqGZojFHnPyHFJxjhSRKkRf5TNhYCRj3YT3Ef41XofWqn61Y9t9BQ9kEbJpWl?rdid=liOa5JELmSNyLabK
[4] https://t.me/tass_agency/307689
[5] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-25-2025
[6] https://t.me/mod_russia/50573
[7]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22384 ;
https://www.facebook.com/GeneralStaff.ua/posts/pfbid031AbZGpscTy486rb6L34FK5jSkYCw68um12zMeSVhnHQt52baxQZ8JEppGR65Kxbml
[8] https://x.com/dmtrltvn/status/1904620272247845159
[9]
https://t.me/kpszsu/31391 ; https://meduza dot
io/feature/2025/03/25/v-den-peregovorov-s-ssha-rossiya-nanesla-udar-po-tsentru-sum
; https://t.me/synegubov/13541; https://t.me/vitaliy_klitschko/4335 ;
https://t.me/kyivoda/26531; https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_zp/17504;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13648; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12277 ;
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/21/masovana-ataka-rf-v-odesi-poshkodzhenyj-torgovyj-czentr-i-bagatopoverhivky-postrazhdaly-pidlitky/;
https://t.me/odeskaODA/9105; https://t.me/synegubov/13505;
https://t.me/synegubov/13503 ; https://t.me/dsns_telegram/39828 ;
https://t.me/milinfolive/144490 ; https://t.me/milinfolive/144493 ;
https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13603 ;
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1902120683699626108 ;
[10]
https://www.state.gov/statement-from-secretary-rubio-and-nsa-waltz-on-call-with-zelenskyy/
;
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/20/world/europe/trump-ukraine-nuclear-plants.html
;
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-ceasefire-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-d45fa1cfde7790f0a8c19e4e997c605c
[11] https://t.me/MID_Russia/54347
[12] https://ria dot ru/20250326/novak-2007531565.html
[13]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar021425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar010225;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031525;
https://isw.pub/UkrWar022025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar020325;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-24-2023;
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-8
[14]
https://www.ans.org/news/article-6015/ukraine-releases-video-of-russian-kamikaze-drones-flying-near-nuclear-plant/;
https://www.kyivpost dot com/post/32001;
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/08/19/europe/ukraine-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-plant-russian-vehicles-intl-hnk/index.html;
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-weaponizes-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant/;
[15]
https://isw.pub/UkrWar090624 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar032025 ;
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-21-2025
[16]
https://www.ft.com/content/f5fee89e-be92-4ca3-9e3c-01078b8a2b64;
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-says-unconditional-withdrawal-russia-ukraine-is-precondition-amend-sanctions-2025-03-26/
[17] https://isw.pub/UkrWar032525
[18] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8735; https://t.me/zsu82odshbr/876
[19] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33867
[20] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522
[21] https://t.me/dva_majors/67684
[22] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33867
[23] https://t.me/romanov_92/46438; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63112
[24]
https://t.me/rusich_army/22072 ; https://t.me/rusich_army/22073 ;
https://t.me/yurasumy/22063; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25957;
https://t.me/wargonzo/25529 ; https://t.me/romanov_92/46439;
https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88803; https://t.me/dazbastadraw/7919;
https://t.me/dva_majors/67662
[25] https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63112
[26] https://t.me/NeoficialniyBeZsonoV/44713; https://t.me/RVvoenkor/88803; https://t.me/NgP_raZVedka/20936
[27] https://t.me/zvizdecmanhustu/2646
[28] https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885
[29] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354
[30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973
[31]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;
https://t.me/dva_majors/67662; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973
[32]
https://armyinform dot
com.ua/2025/03/26/broneyu-abo-na-chomus-duzhe-shvydkomu-vorog-vyprobovuye-varianty-proryvu-pozyczij-syl-oborony/
[33]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;
[34] https://t.me/tass_agency/307624
[35]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;
https://t.me/rybar/69159
[36] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885
[37]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;
https://t.me/wargonzo/25522
[38] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25981; https://t.me/boris_rozhin/159234
[39] https://armyinform.com dot ua/2025/03/26/dalnist-do-20-kilometriv-chasiv-yar-masovo-atakuyut-optovolokonnymy-dronamy/
[40]
https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/25/slabo-pidgotovleni-mozhut-jty-natovpom-na-kramatorskomu-napryamku-vorog-praczyuye-malymy-grupamy/
[41]
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904917840991265095
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904916107376337391;
https://t.me/nm_dnr/13581 ;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904918883846230033;
https://t.me/nm_dnr/13581
[42]
https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1904848254363181316;
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904838046517723156;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1043322721034906&rdid=y1Cu7JFNGd4chRLF;
https:// t.me/creamy_caprice/8738; https:// t.me/voron1OO/133
https://x.com/AudaxonX/status/1904826400286122267
[43] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25996
[44] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33878
[45]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885
[46]
https://suspilne dot
media/donbas/979801-hocut-vijti-na-kostantinivku-ak-vijska-rf-sturmuut-na-toreckomu-napramku/
; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/26/vorog-zajshov-v-budynok-pihota-rubalas-v-toreczku-boyi-jdut-za-kozhnu-stinu/
[47] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-37
[48] https://isw.pub/UkrWar031925
[49] https://t.me/nm_dnr/13595
[50] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973
[51] https://t.me/rybar/69150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973
[52]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885;
https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6856
[53] https://t.me/rybar/69150; https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25973
[54] https://t.me/milinfolive/144892
[55] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25998; https://t.me/voin_dv/14091
[56]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354; https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/6885
[57] https://t.me/voin_dv/14091; https://t.me/wargonzo/25522
[58] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25998
[59] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-9-2025
[60] https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8737 ; https://t.me/ombr_31/383
[61]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357
; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ;
https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/25999 ; https://t.me/voin_dv/14091
[62]
https://mil.in dot
ua/uk/news/na-donechchyni-syly-bezpilotnyh-system-znyshhyly-bronetankovu-kolonu/;
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?mibextid=wwXIfr&v=1284084132692095&rdid=LstJiqMno4yPB4pA
[63] https://t.me/voin_dv/14091
[64] https://t.me/voin_dv/14077; https://t.me/voin_dv/14088
[65]
https://t.me/creamy_caprice/8734;
https://www.facebook.com/3012NGU/videos/643826108348335/;
https://t.me/Zabolocini;
https://x.com/moklasen/status/1904662479914872997
[66] https://
t.me/tass_agency/307636; https:// t.me/motopatriot78/33864; https://
t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117; https:// t.me/yurasumy/22064
[67]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12300;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035qSLdScgpZtLhM4Npqt6mxyXkVJmoP24hhC5aGqATKqgF5PneVFqDkTLspmd5UsTl;
https://t.me/wargonzo/25522; https://t.me/yurasumy/22064;
https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117
[68] https://t.me/motopatriot78/33866; https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/63117
[69] https://t.me/vrogov/19705; https://t.me/rogozin_do/6906
[70]
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22385 ; https://t.me/SJTF_Odes/12300;
https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22357; https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/22354 ;
https://www.facebook.com/OperationalCommandSouth/posts/pfbid035qSLdScgpZtLhM4Npqt6mxyXkVJmoP24hhC5aGqATKqgF5PneVFqDkTLspmd5UsTl
[71] https://t.me/kpszsu/31433
[72]
https://t.me/kpszsu/31433; https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/13693 ;
https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/1904822986655363390;
https://t.me/vilkul/10047; https://armyinform.com dot
ua/2025/03/26/kryvij-rig-perezhyv-najmasovishu-z-pochatku-vijny-rosijsku-ataku-dronamy/;
https://t.me/vilkul/10045; https://t.me/police_su_region/26816;
https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/25462
[73] https://t.me/akovalenko1989/9028
[74] https://t.me/rogozin_do/6903
[75] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-efforts-centralize-drone-units-may-degrade-russian-drone-operations
[76] http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76536 ; http://kremlin dot ru/events/president/news/76542
[77] https://tass dot ru/obschestvo/23513109
[78] https://tass dot ru/ekonomika/23502987
